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THE CONTROVERSY OVER MISS PIGGYS NEW FRIEND:
ISSUES OF INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION IN
HORMEL FOODS CORP. v. JIM HENSON
PRODUCTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most recent trends in the field of marketing is the
advent of full scale merchandising of motion picture inspired prod-
ucts.1 With new products on the market resulting from this phe-
nomenon, there is increased opportunity for potential
infringement and dilution of already existing trademarks. As a
remedy for possible trademark violations, both federal and state
legislatures have enacted statutes which protect consumers and
trademarks in instances where two marks compete. 2
This body of legislation provides two different causes of action.
First, in federal legislation, the Lanham Act provides for a trade-
mark infringement action to protect consumers against confusion
about the source or origin of a product.3 Second, state statutes pro-
vide for a trademark dilution action which protects the trademark's
inherent selling power. 4 In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Produc-
1. See Sophie McKenzie, Licensing: Reel Money, MARKETING WEEK, Sept. 6, 1996,
at 1, available in 1996 WL 10307599. Movie merchandising is highly valued by stu-
dios. See id. Today, movies are viewed as major investments capable of producing
related merchandise. See id. As a result of such potential for increased revenue,
many film studios have created their own merchandising divisions to meet the de-
mands of movie merchandising. See id. While it is true that a movie studio must
take a risk and merely speculate as to the success of its movie and related merchan-
dise, the potential for a substantial profit is large. See id. In 1995, movie related
merchandise marketed to coincide with a motion picture accounted for $16.2 bil-
lion in retail sales. See Kristen Baldwin, Toyz in the 'Hood The Summer-Movie Merchan-
dising Bonanza Kicks Off, Err. WEEKLY, Mar. 15, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
8794146.
2. These statutes create causes of action for trademark violations. For a dis-
cussion of the federal Lanham Act, see infra notes 18-62 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of state antidilution statutes see infra notes 63-103 and accompany-
ing text.
3. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
See generally Peter W. Smith, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable
Lanham Act Infringement Standard, 12 CA, ozo L. REv. 1525, 1529 (1991) (gener-
ally explaining Lanham Act and its legislative history). This federal legislation con-
trols the spread of consumer confusion by protecting the quality of identifying
trademarks. See id.
4. See Howard J. Shire, Dilution Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws an
Appropriate Alternative to the Law of Infringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273, 273
(1987). An action for dilution is an entirely separate legal theory than an action
(353)
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tions,5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed both a federal
trademark infringement claim and a state dilution claim and de-
nied relief on both grounds.6 While evaluating the claim of trade-
mark infringement and dilution in this case, the court faced the
task of considering such claims in the context of a parody. 7 Such a
situation places the court in a position of having to balance the
need to protect an established trademark and the need to protect
artistic expression. The Hormel decision signifies a justifiable bal-
ance of such competing interests.
This Note examines the Second Circuit's decision in Hormel.
The second section delineates the relevant statutes and case law
pertaining to both an infringement and a dilution claim.8 Section
three explains the factual background for the Hormel case.9 Section
four, the narrative analysis, details the Second Circuit's reasoning
in reaching its holding.1 0 Section five critically analyzes the Second
Circuit's decision in light of related precedent in trademark and
dilution law relating to a type of parody exception in trademark
disputes.1 1 Finally, section six explores the impact the Hormel deci-
sion will have in the area of infringement and dilution law. 12
II. BACKGROUND
The competitive marketplace contains countless trademarks
used to identify specific products.13 Generally, there are two
sources of protection for such trademarks. The Lanham Act1 4 cre-
for trademark infringement. See id. State antidilution statutes grant protection to
"distinctive" marks, even without a likelihood of confusion. See id.
5. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
6. Id. at 508.
7. See id. at 503. The court sees the use of the "Spa'am" character as "simply
another in a long line of Muppet lampoons." Id.
8. For a discussion of section two, see infra notes 13-126 and accompanying
text.
9. For a discussion of section three, see infra notes 127-44 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of section four, see infra notes 145-211 and accompany-
ing text.
11. For a discussion of section five, see infra notes 212-46 and accompanying
text.
12. For a discussion of section six, see infra notes 24749 and accompanying
text.
13. See Pat Youden, Creations of the Mind Evoke Tough Legal Challenges, TRIANGLE
Bus. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 11280073. Examples of some
common trademarks include the words "Pepsi", "General Electric" and "Buick",
and the logo of a bearded Kentucky colonel who represents the fast food chain
Kentucky Fried Chicken. See id.
14. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
For the relevant text of the Act, see infra note 22.
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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ates a federal claim for trademark infringement which protects con-
sumers from confusion as to the source or origin of the goods.'
5
The second source of protection is a state's antidilution statute. A
state claim for dilution under a state's specific antidilution statute
protects a trademark's inherent and unique selling power for a spe-
cific good.16 Case law interpreting state antidilution statutes dem-
onstrates the judicial struggle to define "dilution" and determine if
dilution occurred. 17 This judicial struggle is intensified by the ten-
sion between protecting consumers from confusion and protecting
a manufacturer's trademark.
A. Federal Lanham Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Trademark Act.18 In
passing the Lanham Act, Congress had two goals. First, Congress
wanted to codify existing trademark law; second, Congress desired
15. See Shire, supra note 4, at 273. The notion of infringement under the
Lanham Act seeks to limit consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of
products and services available in the marketplace. See Smith, supra note 3, at
1527. The analysis under the Lanham Act is therefore limited to whether a reason-
ably prudent consumer would be confused as to the source of a particular good or
service. See id.
16. See Nancy S. Greiwe, Antidilution Statutes: A New Attack on Comparative Ad-
vertising, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 178, 182 (1982). The underlying concern of the origi-
nal supporters of the dilution theory was the protection of the selling power of
trademarks. See id. As the theory of dilution evolved, protection extended to addi-
tional types of trademarks. See id. Originally, courts conceived the protection to
extend to unique marks. See id. Then, courts expanded protection to marks with
secondary meanings. See id. Eventually, protection focused exclusively on the ac-
tual selling power of a mark so that states would protect any mark with "commer-
cial magnetism," regardless of the nature of the mark or the source of the selling
power. See id.
17. Compare Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding sticker parodies reading "Petley Flea Bags" failed to di-
lute plaintiffs trademarks "Teley" and "The Tiny Little Tea Leaf"), with Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1041
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding sticker parodies reading "Garbage Pail Kids" tarnished
and therefore diluted plaintiffs trademark "Cabbage Patch Kids").
18. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
See David S. Welkowitz, Reexaming Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 532
(1991) (generally explaining Lanham Act). The passage of the Lanham Act repre-
sents the culmination of a series of bills introduced in Congress since 1938. See
Smith, supra note 3, at 1530. See id. The protection granted to the trademark
owner has evolved over time. See id. Earlier decisions protected against piracy by
sanctioning competitors who attempted to compete dishonestly by passing off their
products as those of the trademark owner. See Welkowitz, supra at 532. The com-
mon law provided protection against this dishonest practice in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. See id. After World War II, Congress passed the Lanham
Act which had a nationwide scope as federal law and became the main source of
trademark protection. See id.
3
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to protect trademarks and secure business and public goodwill. 19
The legislative history reveals the Senate Committee's attempt to
protect trademark holders from unfair competition based upon the
use of the trademark holder's goodwill.20 The Lanham Act reflects
the dual goals of common law trademark principles: protecting
consumers from confusing product imitations and saving manufac-
turers' investments from misappropriation. 21
Section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act22 deals specifically with an
infringement action protecting against consumer confusion when
similar marks are used.23 The standard courts use to identify a vio-
lation under section 1114(1) is the "likelihood of consumer confu-
sion" between the two marks.24 Confusion among an appreciable
19. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1530. The Senate Committee that reviewed the
Lanham Act stated that the Act "has as its object the protection of trade-marks,
securing to the owner the good will of his business and protecting the public
against spurious and falsely marked goods." See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333, at
1274 (1946)).
20. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1530-32 (discussing legislative history of Lan-
ham Act).
21. See Steven M. Perez, Comment, Confronting Biased Treatment of Trademark
Parody Under the Lanham Act, 44 EMORY L.J. 1451, 1457 (1995) (explaining dual
goals of common law that are reflected in Lanham Act).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994). Section 1114(1) provides for civil liability
against any person who shall, without consent of the registrant:
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
ble imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in con-
nection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive;
(b) or reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imita-
tion to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertise-
ments intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id.
23. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1532. Clearly targeted by the Lanham Act are
those infringers utilizing the trademarks of another to sell a similar product. See id.
24. See Perez, supra note 21, at 1454. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo
Co., the court articulated the standard for a violation of section 1114(1) by stating
"[i]t is well settled that the crucial issue in an action for trademark infringement
... is whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the
source of the goods in question." 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Mush-
room Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)). For a
discussion of various tests used to examine likelihood of confusion, see J. THOMAS
McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.01 [1], at
23-6 (3d ed. 1992). For example, a plaintiff in a § 1114(1) infringement action
attempting to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion may use survey evidence, evi-
dence of actual confusion or argue based upon a clear inference arising from a
comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use. See id.
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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number of reasonable buyers satisfies the likelihood of confusion
test.2 5 Finally, for a section 1114(1) claim, the confusion must be
"probable;" it is not sufficient if the confusion is only "possible."26
Decisions concerning federal claims of trademark infringe-
ment under section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act reflect a degree of
judicial certainty.27 Courts consistently apply the "likelihood of
consumer confusion" standard to determine whether section
1114(1) of the Lanham Act has been violated. 28 The consistent ap-
plication of this standard leads to judicial certainty in trademark
infringement cases. Cases analyzing an infringement claim look to
a multi-factor test to balance the interests of both sides to reach an
equitable conclusion.29
Courts rely on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' landmark
decision, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,30 when analyzing
a likelihood of confusion claim. In that case, the plaintiff, Polaroid,
alleged that defendant's use of the name Polarad as a trademark,
§ 23.01[2], at 23-10. In the majority of trademark cases, the measurement of the
extent of likelihood of confusion will not be exact, but more of a calculated esti-
mate. See id. More important perhaps than the number of instances of confusion
is the class of persons confused and the degree of their confusion. See id.
25. See McCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.01[2], at 23-9. For a complete discus-
sion of the elements of the likelihood of consumer confusion, see id. § 23.01 [1]-
23.01[2], at 23-6 to 23-11.
26. See id. § 23.01 [3] [a], at 23-11. The test of infringement is the probability
of confusion, not proof of actual confusion. See id. § 23.02 [1], at 23-30. The plain-
tiff does not have to prove any instances of actual confusion. See id.
27. Thisjudicial certainty is reflected in the use of multi-factor tests employed
to balance the positions of the competing sides. See Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987
F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying eight factor test of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying eight factor test of Polar-
oid); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 789-90 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (applying eight factor test of Polaroid); Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.,
699 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying eight factor test of Polaroid). See also
Toho Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying its
own eight factor test); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir.
1980) (applying its own six factor test).
28. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.01[1], at 23-8. McCarthy states that
"the test of likelihood of confusion is the touchstone of trademark infringement."
Id.
29. See MarlaJ. Kaplan, Antidilution Statutes and the First Amendment, 21 Sw. U.
L. REv. 1139, 1159 (1992). In order to prove a likelihood of confusion claim, a
court generally requires that the plaintiff satisfy a multi-factor test. See id. The
court in Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp. noted that "[i]t is well settled that in cases involv-
ing a claim under the Lanham Act the trier of fact must consider and balance the
factors set forth in [Polaroid] to determine the 'likelihood of confusion.'" 987 F.2d
91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
30. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
357
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infringed on Polaroid's federal trademark rights. 3 1 The Polaroid
court set forth an eight factor test to help determine if a likelihood
of confusion occurred. 32 The eight factors cited by the Polaroid
court include: strength of the mark, degree of similarity between
the marks, proximity of the products, bridging the gap, actual con-
fusion, bad faith, quality of the products, and consumer
sophistication. 33
While the eight Polaroid factors serve as a useful guide in any
likelihood of confusion analysis, a court balances these factors as it
deems appropriate. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in Nikon Inc. v. IRon Corp.34 demonstrates this judicial freedom. 35 A
manufacturer of expensive cameras, Nikon, brought suit against
Ikon, a manufacturer of inexpensive cameras, alleging trademark
infringement and dilution by Ikon's logo, "Ikon Cameras."36 In an-
alyzing whether a likelihood of confusion existed, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals applied the Polaroid factors.3 7 The court
31. Id. at 493. The plaintiff, Polaroid Corporation, owned the trademark "Po-
laroid." See id. Polaroid has become a well known name because of the products
produced from its sheet polarizing process. See id. at 494. The defendant, Polarad
Electronics, was in the principal business of selling microwave devices. See id. Pola-
rad claimed it created its name by combining the names of its founders. See id.
Polaroid objected to the name Polarad and claimed to be entitled to protection of
its distinctive mark in at least certain areas of the large electronics field. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id. The Polaroid factors include: strength of the mark - this factor exam-
ines the ability of the trademark to identify the goods sold; similarity between the
marks - this factor compares how alike the marks are, especially how similar the
marks appear in their settings and context; proximity of the products - this factor
focuses on whether the products compete within a certain market; bridging the gap -
this factor turns on the likelihood of whether the senior user will enter the market
of the junior user; actual confusion - this factor centers on whether there is any
evidence of genuine confusion among consumers between the two marks; bad faith
- this factor examines whether there has been any predatory intent or bad will on
the part of the junior user; quality of the products - this factor focuses on the quality
of the junior user's product which might reflect on the senior user's product and
mark; consumer sophistication - this factor explores how careful the average con-
sumer of a product is. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1546-52.
34. 987 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. Id. at 96.
36. See id. at 92-93. The defendant, manufacturer of inexpensive 35 mm and
110 mm pocket cameras, claimed he selected the trademark "Ikon" because of the
familiarity of the word and the religious connotations associated with it. See id. at
93. Furthermore, he claimed he was aware of the existence of Nikon cameras,
(manufactured by the plaintiff Nikon in this case); but claimed he did not foresee
a potential for confusion between the two names because he never intended to
compete with such a dominant force in the camera industry. See id.
37. See id at 94-96. The court discussed each of the Polaroid factors in turn.
First, the court concluded that there was no dispute over the strength of the Nikon
mark and accordingly, the mark deserved broad protection. See id. at 94. Second,
the court found that the two marks were indeed similar by focusing on the similar-
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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explained, however, that the Polaroid list of factors is not exhaustive
and no single factor is determinative. 38 According to the Nikon
court, the Polaroid factors were an analytical tool, not a rigid
formula.3 9 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co.,40 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed another "likelihood of con-
fusion" claim. The Universal court utilized Polaroid's eight factors in
its analysis. 41 The court recognized, however, that in order to de-
termine if there was a likelihood of confusion, the court could take
other factors into account beyond those enumerated in Polaroid.42
As a result, the Universal court employed a new factor when it com-
pared the extent to which the allegedly infringing character cap-
tured the total concept of the protected characters. 43 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals considered a variety of factors before find-
ity in sound between the two marks and the similar display and packaging of the
products. See id. at 94-95. Third, the court looked to the proximity of the prod-
ucts and concluded that even though the parties have cameras at opposite ends of
the spectrum in terms of price, there was substantial overlap between the two com-
panies' products. See id. at 95. Fourth, the court found that the bridging the gap
factor weighed in favor of Nikon because there was already market overlap be-
tween the two competitors. See id. Fifth, the court looked to the sophistication of
consumers and determined that the purchasers of the less expensive cameras were
often amateur photographers and as such, could be confused about an affiliation
between the products. See id. Sixth, the court looked at the quality of the products
and concluded that while Ikon's quality is good for its price, it does not have the
same quality controls as Nikon does over its products. See id. Seventh, the court
found that the actual confusion factor weighed in favor of Ikon because there was
very limited evidence of such actual confusion. See id. at 95-96. Finally, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence that Ikon acted in bad faith since it re-
jected the advice of counsel to adopt a different mark. See id. at 96. The court
concluded that with the exception of actual confusion, the factors weighed heavily
in favor of Nikon. See id.
38. See id. at 94.
39. Nikon, 987 F.2d at 96.
40. 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984). In Universal, the plaintiff, Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., owned various "King Kong" trademarks. See id. at 114. The defendant,
Nintendo Co., created and manufactured the "Donkey Kong" video game. See id.
at 113. Universal objected to Nintendo's use of the Donkey Kong name arguing
that Nintendo's product erroneously suggested to consumers that Universal was
the creator of the video game. See id. at 114.
41. Id. at 115-20.
42. See id. at 116 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. PoloradElecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495
(2d Cir. 1961)). The court stated that "[e]ven this extensive catalogue does not
exhaust the possibilities-the court may have to take still other variables into ac-
count." Id. The court also noted that questions regarding the likelihood of confu-
sion tend to be fact-sensitive. See id.
43. Id. The new factor compared the extent to which the allegedly infringing
character captures the "total concept and feel" of the protected character in order
to determine whether there exists a likelihood of confusion. See id. (quoting
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). This new
factor is an addition to the eight enumerated Polaroid factors. See id.
359
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ing no likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of
Donkey Kong.4 4
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals altered the Polaroid fac-
tors in Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co.45 In Squirtco, the court applied a six
factor test to determine likelihood of confusion in an infringement
dispute. 46 By adopting a six factor approach to determining a likeli-
hood of confusion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals departed
from Polaroids eight factor test that many courts had relied upon
for Lanham Act claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that confusion existed between the two competitors' marks and en-
joined Seven-Up from using the name "Quirst" for its drink.47
The Ninth Circuit Court's approach is somewhat different
from both the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit approaches.
In Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,48 a Japanese corporation that
was the exclusive merchandising representative of the Godzilla 49
name, brought an infringement action against Sears, the manufac-
turer of "Bagzilla" garbage bags. 50 The Toho court's analysis fo-
cused on the marketing channels used by the secondary or junior
user. 5 1 This factor looks at the possible convergence of the meth-
ods used by each user to sell their product.52 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Sears' use of "Bagzilla" did not "impair
the effectiveness of the name and image of Godzilla."53
44. See id. at 116-20. The court concluded that the two characters and stories
were so different that no question of fact was presented on the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion issue. See id. at 117.
45. 628 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1980). The plaintiff, Squirtco, objected to the
Seven-Up Company's introduction of the "Quirst" trademark in 1978. See id. at
1088. Squirtco first used its "Squirt" trademark in 1937 to identify a carbonated
grapefruit drink. See id. Squirtco believed the names "Squirt" and "Quirst" were
too similar and would therefore create confusion among consumers. See id.
46. Id. at 1091. The six factors applied by the Squirtco court are: the strength
of the plaintiffs mark, the similarity between the trademark and the defendant's
mark, the competitive proximity of the products on which the respective marks are
placed, the intent of the alleged infringer to pass off his goods as those of the
trademark holder, the incidents of actual confusion, and the degree of care likely
to be exercised by the potential customers of the trademark holder. See id.
47. See id. at 1092.
48. 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 789. Godzilla is a fictitious movie monster who is green and gigantic
in appearance. See id.
50. Id. at 789-90.
51. Id. at 790. The court used this factor rather than adopting the Polaroid
factor of quality of the junior user's mark. See id.
52. See id. (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir.
1979)).
53. See Toho, 645 F.2d at 793. The court found that the representation of the
creature was a humorous caricature, an exact copy. See id. at 790.
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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Some trademark infringement cases are decided on wholly dif-
ferent grounds. Some courts characterize the trademark in dis-
pute as a parody and examine the facts in light of such a
classification. 54 For example, in 1969, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied injunctive relief to the Girl
Scouts in Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. v. Personality Posters Mfg.55 The
court held Personality's poster was a parody which, while angering
the Girl Scouts, did not lead to a likelihood of confusion.5 6
In another parody analysis, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,5 7 found
an attempt at a parody to infringe and dilute. Like the defendant
in Girl Scouts, Gemini was a manufacturer who produced and dis-
tributed posters.58 The Coca-Cola court found that Gemini's posters
infringed upon and diluted Coca-Cola's mark.5 9
Coca-Cola is distinguishable from Girl Scouts for a variety of rea-
sons. For example, the Coca-Cola court emphasized the widespread
use of Coca-Cola's mark, the similarity between Coca-Cola's and
Gemini's marks and the injury to Coca-Cola deemed likely to re-
sult.60 Unlike Girl Scouts, where the court held that the evidence
presented failed to show that any consumer would believe the Girl
54. For a discussion of parodies, see infra notes 104-126 and accompanying
text.
55. 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The plaintiff, Personality Posters
Mfg., produced and distributed posters depicting a smiling girl wearing the well-
known green uniform of the Junior Girl Scouts with her hands clasped above her
protruding, clearly pregnant stomach with the phrase "Be Prepared." See id. at
1230.
56. See id. at 1231, 1233. The court cites the absence of any evidence showing
that the poster has damaged the plaintiff in any way. See id. at 1235. The court
found that the Girl Scouts failed to establish the requisite element of customer
confusion. See id. at 1233. Even though the Girl Scouts received phone calls from
the public expressing indignation concerning the poster, the court found that in-
dignation is not equal to confusion. See id. at 1231. In fact, the court found to the
contrary that the indignation of those who called would appear to make it clear
that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being unfairly put upon, not that the Girl
Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the poster. See id. The Girl Scouts
also brought a cause of action under New York's antidilution statute. See id. at
1233-34. The district court denied relief on this cause of action based on similar
grounds. See id.
57. 364 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Defendant Gemini Rising, Inc., cre-
ated a poster which replaced and enlarged the familiar Coca Cola logo and altered
it to read "Enjoy Cocaine." Id. at 1186.
58. See id. at 1187.
59. Id. at 1193.
60. Id. at 1191.
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Scouts produced such a poster,61 the Coca-Cola court found a clear
indication of public confusion. 62
B. State Antidilution Statutes
Another form of trademark protection falls under the ambit of
state law. 63 While an action under the Lanham Act protects con-
sumers from confusion, state antidilution statutes protect manufac-
turers against damage to the inherent selling value of their mark.6 4
The doctrine of dilution originated in 1927 with Frank I.
Schechter's seminal article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protec-
tion.65 As proposed by Schechter, the purpose of the dilution con-
cept is to protect the senior user's mark from losing its selling
power due to "the gradual whittling away or dispersion" of the se-
nior user's mark.66 This early dilution doctrine considered the
trademark's advertising power the primary, and perhaps the only,
real value of the trademark worthy of protection.6 7 The dilution
concept focuses on protecting the manufacturer's interest in the
goodwill and selling power of a mark.68
61. See Girl Scouts, 304 F. Supp. at 1231.
62. Coca-Cola, 364 F. Supp. at 1189.
63. See Shire, supra note 4, at 273. State law trademark protections exist sepa-
rate from infringement based federal Lanham Act protections. See id.
64. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1149. The dilution doctrine emerged "to
protect a trademark owner from an unauthorized use that is likely to injure the
owner's business reputation or the distinctiveness of the trademark." See id. at n.78
(citing Mark A. Dagitz, Note, Trademark Parodies and Free Speech: An Expansion of
Parodists'First Amendment Rights in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 73 IOWA
L. REv. 961, 967-68 (1987)).
65. 40 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1927).
66. See Schechter, supra note 65, at 825. "[Schechter] reviewed the associa-
tional aspects of trademarks and demonstrated how they created familiarity in the
public's mind with a particular product far beyond the actual symbolic value of the
mark itself." Michael L. Taviss, In Search of a Consistent Trademark Test: Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 58 CINCINNATI L. REv. 1449, 1455
(1990). The mark became the owner's most powerful selling weapon. See id. As
Schechter put it, "[t]he mark actually sells the goods." Id. (quoting Schechter,
supra note 65, at 819).
67. See Taviss, supra note 66, at 1455. The original dilution theory of protec-
tion did not require a showing of confusion among consumers. See id. Schechter
inherently believed uses that tended to diminish the public's association of the
mark with a certain level of satisfaction in certain goods and services bearing that
mark were to be discouraged. See id.
68. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.13[1] [b], at 24-108. The dilution doc-
trine's concern is the granting of protection to trademarks beyond that provided
by the classic likelihood of confusion test. See id. The dilution theory grants pro-
tection to strong, well-recognized marks even without a likelihood of confusion.
See id.
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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Although the history ofjudicial reaction to the concept of dilu-
tion is filled with ambiguities as to the meaning of "dilution," com-
mon concepts of dilution emerged in case law.69 Generally,
dilution is a weakening of the mark's ability to clearly distinguish
one source from another.70 Schechter explained this concept by
noting that if a court permitted such things as Rolls-Royce restau-
rants, Rolls-Royce cafeterias, Rolls-Royce pants, and Rolls-Royce
candy, then in time, the Rolls-Royce mark would disappear as a dis-
tinguishing mark.71
There are two subsets of the dilution doctrine. The first subset
is dilution by blurring.7 2 Dilution by blurring occurs when consum-
ers see the plaintiffs unique mark used on a plethora of different
goods.7 3 The mark's unique and distinctive significance to identify
and distinguish one source may be diluted and weakened by the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark on the defendant's goods.7 4
For example, the use of the word Tiffany on a restaurant, while not
likely to cause confusion with the jeweler Tiffany, is likely to blur or
weaken the association of the name Tiffany to solely the jeweler. 75
The Tiffany mark would no longer serve as a unique identifier of
the certain jewelry store.76 The unique and distinctive link between
the word Tiffany and a certain jewelry store is weakened through a
blurring of the Tiffany mark.7 7
The second subset is dilution by tarnishment. Dilution by
tarnishment occurs when the plaintiffs mark is associated with
products which are of shoddy quality.78 Additionally, dilution by
69. See Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 610 (1977). Legislative
acceptance of the antidilution concept has been demonstrated in the past thirty
years. See id. The dilution concept however, has remained so misunderstood or
unpalatable to the courts that it has been largely ignored. See id. For a discussion
of judicial treatment of the dilution doctrine and the difficulties courts still have
with the concept, see Shire, supra note 4, at 274-75.
70. See McCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.13[1] [a], at 24-106.
71. See id.
72. See id. § 24.15[1], at 24-127. Dilution by blurring can occur when the
plaintiff's trademark becomes a strong and famous mark. See id. In such situa-
tions, a trademark creates a strong and unique connection between the word and a
single source of goods and the defendant's use of a similar trademark creates a
question about the origin of the goods. See id.
73. See id. § 24.13[1] [a] [i], at 24-106. Dilution caused by such blurring is the
traditional effect of the theory of dilution. See id.
74. See id. § 24.13[1] [a] [i], at 24-106.
75. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.13[1] [a] [i], at 24-107.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. § 24.16[1], at 24-138.1.
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tarnishment occurs when the senior user's mark is used by the jun-
ior user in an unwholesome context.7 9 To illustrate dilution by
tarnishment, the case of Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc. is helpful.8 0 The manufacture and distribution of
"Garbage Pail Kids" stickers depicting dolls with features similar to
Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in "rude, violent and frequently noxious
settings" tarnishes the wholesome image of the original dolls.8 1
Responding to the concept of dilution first espoused in 1927,
the Model State Trademark Bill attempted to articulate the scope of
protection for a mark's goodwill.8 2 The Model Bill served as a pro-
totype for future state antidilution statutes.8 3 Presently, twenty-four
states have enacted antidilution statutes based upon the Model
Bill.8 4 In keeping with the original dilution concept and the lan-
79. SeeJordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1987) (holding that logo "Lardashe" on large size jeans was unlikely to be
confused with "Jordache," but noting that work can be tarnished if used in un-
wholesome context). For a full discussion of Jordache, see infra notes 113-119 and
accompanying text.
80. 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that use of the phrase
"Garbage Pail Kids" tarnishes "Cabbage Patch Kids" wholesome image therefore
diluting plaintiffs product). Cabbage Patch Kids are toy dolls created by Xavier
Roberts and marketed under the trademark "Cabbage Patch Kids." See id. at 1032.
81. Id. at 1040. See also, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cin-
ema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that defendant's motion pic-
ture featuring uniform strikingly similar to one worn by plaintiffs cheerleading
group was likely to confuse consumers and dilute by tarnishment).
82. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1150 (citing Model State Trademark Bill § 12
(United States Trademark Ass'n 1966)). The Model State Trademark Bill provides
in pertinent part:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at com-
mon law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for
injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Id. (quoting Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (United States Trademark Associa-
tion 1964)).
83. See id. In 1947, Massachusetts enacted the nation's first antidilution stat-
ute, twenty years after the concept of dilution first developed. See Taviss, supra
note 67, at 1457.
84. See McCARThY, supra note 24, § 24.14[2], at 24-125. As of 1994, the
twenty-four states that have an antidilution statute modeled after the Model State
Trademark Bill include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1987); California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14,330
(West 1987); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11 i(c) (West 1987); Dela-
ware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151
(West 1987); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 48-512 (1994); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 140, para. 22 (West 1993); Iowa, IowA
CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1997); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1
(West 1993); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); Massachu-
setts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. lOB, § 12 (West 1990); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 417.061 (West 1990); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-334 (1989); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1996); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12
[Vol. 4: p. 353
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guage of the Model Bill, no state requires a showing of competition
or a likelihood of confusion. 85 Instead, these state statutes focus on
the damage caused to the inherent value of a trademark, not on
whether the public has been misled or confused. 86
Decisions based on state antidilution claims demonstrate ambi-
guity in interpreting such statutes.87 This uncertainty is due in part
to the small amount of legislative history of the antidilution stat-
utes88 and the lack of a clear definition of dilution.89 The dilution
concept generally provides protection against injury resulting from
a "whittling away" of a mark's power in cases where a plaintiff can-
not prove likelihood of confusion.90
(1987); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1987); New York, N.Y.
Gen. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 647.107
(1989); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 1124 (West 1990); Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-2-12 (1993); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995);
and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 19.77.160 (West 1990). See Welkowitz,
supra note 18, at 536. New York's antidilution law provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief
in cases of infringement or a mark registered or not registered or in cases
of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition be-
tween the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368(d) (McKinney 1996).
85. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1151. Washington's antidilution statute in
Washington is the only state antidilution statute that differs from the Model State
Trademark Bill and the other state antidilution statutes. See Lisa M. Brownlee,
Note, Mead Data Central v. Toyota and Other Contemporary Dilution Cases: High Noon
for Trademark Law's Misfit Doctrine? 79 TRADEMARK REP. 471, 474 (1989). The Wash-
ington antidilution statute is patterned after the proposed federal antidilution stat-
ute which was rejected by Congress in 1988. SeeWelkowitz, supra note 18, at 581-83
(discussing failed attempt at federal antidilution statute). The Washington an-
tidilution statute offers guidelines to help determine whether a mark is distinctive
enough to merit protection and offers a definition of the term dilution which is
noticeably absent from state statutes modeled after the Model State Trademark
Bill. See Brownlee, supra at 473-75.
86. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1151.
87. See Shire, supra note 4, at 283.
88. See id. For years, the courts either refused to apply or in some way misun-
derstood the clear, literal language of dilution statutes. See id. This judicial reluc-
tance to apply the plain language of these statutes left trademark owners with little
certainty as to how their particular claim would be decided by the court. See id.
89. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the
National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 276 (1985). The legisla-
tive history of state statutes do not provide any clear indication as to what marks
are to be protected, nor to the degree of protection to be afforded. See id. The
essential terms - distinctiveness and dilution - are not defined in the legislative
history. See id. The statutory purposes or goals or the relationship of the relatively
new concept of dilution to the traditional principles of the law of trademarks and
unfair competition are unclear from the legislative history. See id.
90. See id. For example, in the legislative history of New York's antidilution
statute, a committee member defined dilution in terms similar to those expressed
13
Gribbin: The Controversy over Miss Piggy's New Friend: Issues of Infringem
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
366 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
The New York Court of Appeals rendered a significant trade-
mark infringement and dilution decision in 1977.91 Allied Mainte-
nance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.92 set forth a definition of
dilution consistent with the language of New York's antidilution
statute. 93 The decision represented a turning point in dilution
cases because it recognized that the clear language of New York's
antidilution statute did not make recovery dependent upon a show-
ing of a likelihood of consumer confusion or competition.94 The
court stated that the statute means exactly what it says, and should
be applied in accordance with its plain meaning.95 The New York
Court of Appeals defined dilution as "a cancer-like growth of dis-
similar products or services which feeds upon the business reputa-
tion of an established distinctive trade-mark or name. 96
This new dilution definition formed the basis of a two factor
test used to determine whether relief for a dilution claim is justi-
fied. 9 7 The first requirement mandates that a senior user's trade-
mark be distinctive, either through its own strength or through an
acquired secondary meaning.98 The second requirement is that the
defendant's trademark must be likely to dilute.99 The New York
Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction
by Schechter. See id. Accordingly, the goal of the statute was to provide protection
from the "whittling away" of a mark's selling power. See id.
91. See Taviss, supra note 66, at 1459 (citing Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Al-
lied Mechanical Trades, Inc. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977)). Allied Maintenance
sought an injunction against Allied Mechanical's use of Allied Maintenance's mark
under both the Lanham Act and New York's antidilution statute. See Allied Mainte-
nance, 369 N.E.2d at 1163.
92. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
93. See Taviss, supra note 66, at 1459. With the Allied Maintenance decision, a
coherent view of dilution, consistent with the language of the statutes, did finally
emerge when the New York Court of Appeals embraced the true meaning of New
York's antidilution statute. See id.
94. See id. For a further discussion of the significance of the Allied Maintenance
court's holding, see Shire, supra note 4, at 285-88.
95. See Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1166. The court stated that § 368(d)
does not require a showing of confusion to obtain an injunction, but it does re-
quire a "likelihood of injury to business reputation or dilution of the trademark."
Id. The plain meaning of the antidilution statute is that confusion or likelihood of
confusion is not a prerequisite to an action for dilution. See id. at 1165.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1166.
98. See id. The court stated that to merit protection, the plaintiff must possess
a distinctively strong mark or an acquired secondary meaning capable of dilution.
See id.
99. See id. The court did not offer a clear test to determine when dilution is
likely but simply stated that it is necessary to show that the defendant's use of the
trademark is likely to dilute. See id.
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because the court found that the Allied mark failed the first
requirement. 0 0
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals expanded Allied Mainte-
nance two factor test in Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.10 1 The
Sally Gee court offered a third factor to consider in a dilution case,
in addition to the Allied Maintenance two factor test.10 2 Sally Gee held
that a court should also consider whether the junior user purposely
sought to capitalize on the senior user's good will in the mark; that
is, did the junior user possess a "predatory intent?"10 3
C. Parodies
Another line of cases examine both the federal infringement
and state antidilution claims on a different level. These cases in-
volve alleged infringement by the use of a parody.1 0 4 A parody is a
popular form of entertainment and humor which is best under-
stood as a humourous "take off' of another work or of a genre of
works. 105 When considering a parody, courts are faced with the
100. See Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1166. The Allied mark, according to
the court lacked an inherently strong connotation that was susceptible to dilution.
See id.
101. 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983). This case involved defendant Myra Hogan's
use of the name "Sally Lee" as a name for its line of women's clothes and accesso-
ries. See id. at 623. The plaintiff, Sally Gee, Inc., believed the "Sally Lee" name was
too similar to its trademark name "Sally Gee," which the plaintiff used for its own
line of women's clothing and accessories. See id. at 622-23.
102. Id. at 626. The court acknowledged that confusion and competition are
not essential elements in a dilution claim. See id at 624. To support this finding,
the court noted that the purposes for which the antidilution statute was enacted
support the view that confusion and direct competition are not necessary elements
of an antidilution action. See id.
103. Id. at 626. The court stated that the absence of predatory intent by the
junior user is a relevant factor in assessing a claim under New York's antidilution
statute. See id. Finding an absence of predatory intent and therefore no dilution,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied Myra Hogan's request for an injunc-
tion. See id.
104. See Katherine C. Spelman, Trademark Parody - Tarnishment or Free Speech?,
454 PRAc. L. INST./PAT. 567, 570 (1996). Traditionally, to create a parody there
needs to be a distortion or exaggeration of the original characteristic which must
inherently be known to the audience already. See id. The elements of a parody
include: (1) an original host work, (2) the original host work must be famous
already to the audience, (3) the creator of the derivative work, the parody, must
take only so much as is necessary to conjure up the famous host work and (4) the
derivative work which conjures up the famous host must result in a new, original
work. See id.
105. See Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 68
(1992). A parody is a deliberate imitation which mocks another's trademark. See
Perez, supra note 21, at 1454. It is a combination of a taking from a previous work
with an injection of creativity. See id. A parody's success depends on how success-
fully it is able to incorporate recognizable elements of the parody's object. See id.
See also Bruce P. Keller & David H. Bernstein, As Satiric As They Wanna Be: Parody
367
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task of preserving freedom of expression, the integrity of the trade-
mark and the consumer's right not to be confused. Courts attempt
to balance the public interest in the free flow of ideas with the
trademark holder's interest in his work. The tension created be-
tween the fair use of the trademark and the trademark holder's
rights is the subject of much litigation. The parody line of cases
balance this intrinsic conflict.
The case of Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.10 6 presents a
clear example of the parody concept. In Tetley, the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York denied relief under both sec-
tion 1114(1) of the Lanham Act and New York's antidilution stat-
ute. 10 7 The court's trademark infringement analysis in this decision
was based upon a balancing of the eight factors in Polaroid.l08 Ac-
cording to the district court, there was no evidence of actual confu-
sion. 10 9 The broad satirical adaptation of Topp's parodic mark
distinguished the mark from Tetley's actual mark.110 This adapta-
tion the court held, made the parody unlikely to confuse consum-
ers."1 Addressing the dilution claim, the district court noted the
obvious humor of Topps' action and held that the parody's humor
prevented the blurring of Tetley's trademark. 112
Another illustrative parody case, Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd.,"13 offers -insight into the nature of a parody." 4 The sig-
nificance of Jordache in the realm of parody cases stems from its
understanding of a parody. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged that, while a trademark holder has the right to pro-
Lawsuits Under Trademark and Copyright Laws, c962 ALI-ABA 151, 153 (1994)
(describing parodies within context of trademark and copyright laws).
106. 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
107. See id. at 796. The plaintiff, Tetley, Inc., alleged trademark infringement
and dilution when the defendant, Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., distributed packs of
gum and stickers which satirically depicted a label reading "Petley Flea Bags." See
id. at 786.
108. See id. at 789.
109. See id. at 793.
110. See id. at 791-92. The court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff s
and defendant's products were distributed in different markets and that the de-
fendant did not, in bad faith, attempt to exploit the plaintiffs product. See id. at
792. The court found that the very heavy handedness of defendant's parody ap-
peared to assure a clear distinction in the consumer's mind between the two prod-
ucts. See id.
111. See Tetley, 556 F. Supp. at 792.
112. See id. at 794.
113. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
114. See id. at 1483-84. The defendant Hogg Wyld, Ltd., used the name
"Lardasche" on its blue jeans as a parody of plaintiffs "Jordache"jeans trademark.
See id. Jordache sued under both the Lanham Act and New Mexico's antidilution
statute. See id. at 1484.
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tect against consumer confusion, this right does not include the
"right" not to be made fun of in the parody context." 5 The court
held that to simply intend to copy another's trademark does not
necessarily dictate a per se desire to pass off one's goods as an-
other's and to confuse consumers.'1 6 When selecting another's
mark as the object of a parody, the intent is to amuse rather than to
derive benefit from another's goodwill.11 7 The intent in a parody
case must be examined in light of this context." 8 According to the
court, the possibility of increased recognition for Jordache would
not dilute the power of Jordache to sell jeans." 9
In the case of Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publish-
ing Group, Inc.,' 20 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals balanced the
right of free expression in the form of a parody and the rights of
the trademark holder in favor of protecting the entertainment
value of the parody.' 2' The court stated that a parody must convey
conflicting dual messages: that it is both a parody and that it is the
original. 122 The court subsequently weighed the public interest in
free expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion and sided with free expression. 23
Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to
consider a parody involving infringement and dilution in Anheuser-
115. See id. at 1486.
116. See id. The court clarified this by noting that where a party chooses a
mark to be a parody of an existing mark, the intent is not necessarily to confuse
the public, but rather to entertain. See id.
117. See id. at 1486.
118. SeeJordache, 828 F.2d at 1485-86. The Jordache court also held that the
parody in this case might actually increase public identification ofJordache's mark
rather than erode or dilute it. Id. at 1489-90.
119. See id. at 1490.
120. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). The defendant, Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, Inc., parodied plaintiff Cliff Notes, Inc.'s popular guide to liter-
ary works with a guide to three popular modem novels. See id. at 492. These
novels were then placed into a book which parodied the plaintiff's successful Cliffs
Notes. See id. The two books shared some similarities, however, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that there were obvious differences as well. See id.
These differences distinguished Bantam's book as a parody rather than a mere
imitation of Cliffs Notes study guides. See id.
121. See id. at 495.
122. See id. at 494. The court expressed the function of a parody by stating:
A parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: that
it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.
To the extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not only
a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the cus-
tomer will be confused.
Id.
123. See id. at 495.
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Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications.1 24 The Anheuser-Busch court dis-
tinguished this attempt at a parody from other successful parodies
because Balducci's "parody" almost exactly duplicated Anheuser's
mark.12 5 The overwhelming similarity between the parody ad and
the original trademark weighed in favor of protecting the public's
interest not to be confused. 126
III. FACTS
The facts surrounding the litigation of Hormel Foods Corp. v. im
Henson Production involved the alleged infringement and dilution of
Hormel's SPAM trademark through Henson's Spa'am puppet char-
acter in a movie production.12 7 The plaintiff, Hormel Foods, is the
maker of SPAM, a luncheon meat that has been manufactured and
sold in the United States since 1937.128 In addition to its primary
product, SPAM luncheon meat, Hormel began to merchandise sec-
ondary objects including tee-shirts and golf balls. 129 These secon-
dary products bore the SPAM mark and a character called "SPAM-
MAN."130
The defendant, Jim Henson Productions, enjoys great success
and popularity from its motion pictures which feature its cast of
character puppets known as the "Muppets. ' 131 The Muppets have
been featured in numerous television programs and motion pic-
tures. They are distinct and "well known for parodies of brand
124. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). In this case the defendant Balducci Publica-
tions, attempted a parody by placing a satirical Michelob Dry beer advertisement in
its humor magazine. See id. at 772. Balducci's ad in its Snicker magazine was placed
on the entire back page of the magazine. See id. The parody was a mock advertise-
ment for the fictitious product "Michelob Oily," depicting a can of plaintiff
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.'s Michelob Dry pouring oil onto a fish. See id. Anheuser-
Busch brought both an infringement and a dilution claim in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri. See id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the six factor test from Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co. and concluded that
Balducci's use of the Michelob mark created a likelihood of confusion. See id. at
777. For a discussion of Squirtco, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
Addressing the state antidilution claim, the court found that dilution occurred
through tarnishment of Anheuser's product when Balducci made a negative infer-
ence about the quality of Anheuser's mark. See id. at 777.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 776.
127. 73 F.3d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1996).
128. See id at 500. Through the expenditure of millions of dollars in advertis-
ing, Hormel achieved tremendous commercial success from its SPAM product. See
id. In the United States alone, Hormel has sold over five billion cans of its lunch-
eon meat. See id.
129. See id. at 501.
130. See id. at 501-02.
131. See id. at 500.
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names, trademarks, television programs, fictional characters and ce-
lebrities." 13 2 This type of parody format is commonly associated
with Muppet humor.
In February 1996, Henson released a feature film entitled
"Muppet Treasure Island."'133 In addition to Henson's usual and
popular cast of Muppets, the film introduced an additional charac-
ter named Spa'am.134  In "Muppet Treasure Island", Spa'am,
whose name was mentioned only once in the entire movie, was the
high priest of a tribe of wild boars.' 35 Although he posed a humor-
ous threat at first, by the movie's end, Spa'am befriended the Mup-
pets and even helped them escape from the film's villain, Long
John Silver. 136
Hormel objected to the appearance of Spa'am whom it viewed
as grotesque and unclean.1 37 Consequently, Hormel filed a lawsuit
against Henson, fearing that the unwholesome image of Henson's
Spa'am character would cause consumers to question the purity
and high quality of its luncheon meat. 13 8
Additionally, Hormel feared that possible confusion between
the Spa'am character and the luncheon meat would interfere with
SPAM's sales of its secondary products. 3 9 This was because Hen-
son planned to support the release of its film with its own merchan-
dising program. 140 Henson indicated that the merchandise would
always carry the Spa'am likeness beside the name Spa'am. 4 1 The
Spa'am name would never appear alone and any merchandise con-
taining the Spa'am name or image would clearly display the title of
the film. 14 2 Nonetheless, Hormel objected to Henson's plan be-
cause Hormel believed that Henson's merchandising would have a
132. Hormel, 73 F.3d at 502.
133. See id. at 500.
134. See id. at 500-01.
135. See id. at 501.
136. See id.
137. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 501.
138. See id. The court noted that by now, Hormel should be accustomed to
ridicule. See id. Although SPAM is made from pork shoulder and ham meat, nu-
merous jokes have been made based on the public's unfounded perception that
SPAM is a product of unnatural ingredients. See id. The court stated, "[i]n view of
the more or less humorous takeoffs.. . one might think Hormel would welcome
the association with a genuine source of pork." Id.
139. See id. at 501-02.
140. See id. at 501. Henson planned to merchandise licensed products from
the motion picture including food, candy, cereal boxes, clothing, books, and a CD-
ROM computer game. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Horme 73 F.3d at 501.
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negative effect on Hormel's sale of its secondary products. 143 As a
result of Hormel's belief that the Henson movie character would
tarnish Hormel's image of its SPAM product, Hormel filed a lawsuit
alleging trademark infringement and dilution. 144
IV. NARRATr ANALYSIs
In Hormel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confronted two
issues, federal trademark infringement and state trademark dilu-
tion. 145 Specifically, the court decided the issue of whether the use
of the "Spa'am" character created a likelihood of confusion and
whether there was a likelihood of dilution by way of blurring or
tarnishment. 146 The court denied relief under both claims.1 47 The
court analyzed the federal infringement claim first and then ana-
lyzed the state dilution claim.
A. Federal Infringement Claim
The first issue considered by the court was the trademark in-
fringement issue. Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff's trademark is
protected against infringement by use of colorable imitations of the
mark which are likely to deceive or cause confusion.1 48 When de-
ciding such a claim, the court must look to whether there is a likeli-
hood that an appreciable number of ordinary consumers are likely
to be confused as to the source or sponsorship of the goods in ques-
tion.149 To determine the likelihood of such confusion, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Polaroid eight factor test. 150
143. See id. at 501-02. The lower court in this dispute held that Henson's use
of Spa'am did not show a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Hormel Foods
Corp. v.Jim Henson Prod., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 5473, 1995 WL 567369, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Hormel I]. Additionally, the lower court held that Hor-
mel failed to show a likelihood of confusion or dilution. See id. at *13.
144. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 497.
145. Id. at 501. The court also considered the scope of appeal from the dis-
trict court, and determined that the issue of Henson's future merchandising was
ripe for determination by the district court and therefore ripe for appellate review.
See id. at 508.
146. See id. at 479.
147. See id. The district court denied Hormel's request for a permanent in-
junction against Jim Henson Productions. See Hormel I, 1995 WL 567369, at *12.
148. Hormel, 73 F.3d at 502. For a discussion of the Lanham Act, see supra
notes 18-62 and accompanying text.
149. See id.
150. See id. For a discussion of the Polaroid factors, see supra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 4: p. 353
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/6
1997] ISSUES OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION
First the court considered the strength of the plaintiff's
mark.151 The stronger the plaintiffs mark, the more likely it is that
the defendant's mark will conjure up the image of the plaintiffs
mark.152 Hormel argued that Henson's mark would cause the pub-
lic to associate Spa'am with SPAM, and thus cause confusion as to
the source of the two marks. 53 This confusion, Hormel asserted,
would interfere with its merchandising of secondary products.15 4
Henson argued that its use of Spa'am is simply another Muppet-
type parody.155 When consumers see the name Spa'am associated
with the movie, Henson argued that consumers will understand the
joke as a humorous parody. 156 The court held that Henson's par-
ody was particularly subtle and therefore Spa'am was recognized as
a parody.157
Next, the court looked to the degree of similarity between the
marks. 158 Hormel contended that although Spa'am in no way re-
sembled Hormel's luncheon meat or character SPAM-MAN, the de-
piction of Henson's puppet alone would invoke the name SPAM
because consumers would associate the name with the figure on
Henson's merchandise. 59
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Hormel's argu-
ment that the marks were similar because of the possibility of an
association of the Hormel name and the Henson mark by consum-
ers. 160 Although the court noted that there was a passing resem-
blance between the names Spa'am and SPAM, there were also
significant differences.161 These differences warranted a finding
that no similarity between the marks existed. 162 The court further
found that the setting in which the marks were used influenced the
151. See id.
152. See id. at 503.
153. See Horme 73 F.3d at 501. Hormel worried that the sales of SPAM would
drop if its SPAM was linked "with evil in porcine form." Id.
154. See id. at 502.
155. See id. at 500-01.
156. See id. at 503.
157. See id.
158. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. The court pointed out the difference between the spelling and
pronunciation of the two marks. See id. The spelling of the movie character
Spa'am is divided in two by an apostrophe and it contains two "a"s instead of one,
as in the spelling of the luncheon meat, SPAM. See id. In addition, the movie
character Spa'am is pronounced as two distinct syllables while the luncheon meat
SPAM is pronounced as only one. See id.
162. See id. at 504.
373
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degree of similarity. 163 Since Henson planned to include the name
Spa'am next to any depiction of the boarish character, the context
in which the Hormel and Henson marks would be used was strik-
ingly different and would distinguish the marks for the
consumer. 164
The third factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis under
Polaroid is proximity of the products.165 The court concluded that
Hormel and Henson each occupied distinct merchandising mar-
kets.166 SPAM derived its associations primarily from the market of
luncheon meat, whereas Henson's market was motion pictures and
television. 167 The court found it unlikely that consumers would
confuse merchandise featuring Spa'am with similar items displaying
the SPAM trademark since the markets were distinctive.1 68
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the next fac-
tor under the Polaroid analysis as "bridging the gap." 169 This factor
refers to the senior user's interest in related markets and possible
expansion into other fields.170 The court concluded that Hormel
failed to show any interest in entering the field of puppet motion
pictures.171 Absent a desire by Hormel to bridge the gap into the
field of entertainment, there was no potential that consumers
would relate Hormel to such an enterprise.17 2
Actual confusion between the two marks is the next Polaroid
factor. 173 Hormel argued that the media's misspellings and mispro-
163. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503. The court noted that Henson planned to
always use the name Spa'am next to a likeness of the wild boar puppet. See id. In
addition, the words "Muppet Treasure Island" would always be prominently dis-
played wherever the name Spa'am appeared. See id. at 504.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. The court noted that purchasers of SPAM merchandise would
generally be consumers of the luncheon meat product, and that consumers of
merchandise relating to the movie with the likeness or name of Spa'am would buy
it because they liked Spa'am, the Muppets, or the movie "Muppet Treasure Is-
land." See id. Therefore, the separation between the markets for luncheon meat
and puppet entertainment carried over into the secondary merchandising market.
See id. at 504.
167. See id.
168. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 504. The court found that the character Spa'am,
even as it appeared on merchandise, would be defined almost entirely by his ap-





173. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 504.
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nunciations of Spa'am evidenced actual confusion. 174 The court
dismissed this argument by noting that the media never confused
the source or sponsorship of the two marks. 175 Furthermore, the
different contexts in which the marks appeared prohibited a possi-
ble finding of confusion as to source or sponsorship. 176
Bad faith on the part of the junior user is another factor used
to determine a likelihood of confusion in the Polaroid test. 177 Hen-
son's Spa'am character displayed an attempt to create a parody, not
a take-off of Hormel's SPAM-MAN. 178 Therefore, the court rea-
soned that Henson would not gain anything by creating a confusion
between the two marks.179 The success of Henson's parody de-
pended on consumer recognition of Hormel's product.180 It was
not in Henson's interest to create confusion among consumers. 181
The court proceeded to examine the quality of the prod-
ucts.' 82 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Hen-
son's products were of high quality as was Hormel's SPAM, thus, no
injury existed on the basis that Henson's product might cause a
consumer to believe Hormel's product was inferior. 1 3
Considering the likelihood of confusion, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals examined the degree of consumer sophistica-
tion. 184 The court found that consumers who would likely purchase
Spa'am merchandise would do so because they enjoyed the Mup-
pets, not because they mistakenly believed the Spa'am merchandise
was a SPAM product.' 85 Conversely, consumers who purchased
174. See id. at 502. To support this argument, Hormel pointed out that some
newspaper accounts already confused the names SPAM and Spa'am. See id. The
court found that each of these reported accounts antedated the initial public show-
ing of "Muppet Treasure Island." See id.
175. See id. at 504.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 505.
178. See Hormel 73 F.3d at 505. The court's decision on the factor of bad faith
was guided by the notion that Henson's parody depends on consumer recognition
that Spa'am is a Muppet lampoon and not simply a modified version of SPAM-
MAN. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 505.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 505. In responding to Hormel's contention that
Spa'am would call into question the quality of its SPAM luncheon meat, the court
noted that the findings suggest Spa'am is a positive character. See id. The court
found that Spa'am is not unclean and that a simple humorous reference to the fact
that SPAM is made from pork will not be harmful to Spam's public image. See id.
184. See id. This factor is related to the concept of market proximity. See id.
185. See id.
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SPAM products did so because of the product's affiliation with
SPAM, not the Muppets; thus, there existed minimal threat of com-
petition between the companies respective markets.186
The final factor in the Polaroid analysis used by the Hormel
court was likelihood of confusion. 187 The court concluded that the
element of parody in Henson's Spa'am merchandise distinguished
it from Hormel's merchandise. 188 The apparent nature of the par-
ody combined with Henson's use of the "Muppet Treasure Island
mark" on its merchandise precluded a likely finding of confusion
between SPAM merchandise and Spa'am merchandise.1 89 Balanc-
ing these factors, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Hormel's infringement claim was meritless as no likelihood of con-
fusion existed between SPAM and Spa'am.190
B. State Antidilution Claim
The second issue in this appeal was Hormel's claim of dilution
under New York's antidilution statute.1 91 The grounds for a dilu-
tion claim are based on the likelihood of injury to a business' repu-
tation or of a dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark.192
The court recognized that dilution originates from the notion that
"a trademark can lose its 'ability' to clearly and unmistakably distin-
guish one source through unauthorized use."1 93 The court applied
the two part test from Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.194 to estab-
lish a dilution claim: (1) ownership of a distinctive mark and (2) a
186. See id. Once again, the court noted that consumers would not be con-
fused as to the source of the products since all Muppet merchandise featuring the
image or likeness of Spa'am would carry the "Muppet Treasure Island" mark. See
id.
187. Id.
188. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 505. The obvious, though harmless, character of
the parody and the prominence of the "Muppet Treasure Island" mark strongly
indicated that consumers were not likely to be confused between merchandise car-
rying the SPAM logo and products featuring Spa'am. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 506. For a discussion of state antidilution statutes, see supra
notes 63-103 and accompanying text. For the text of New York's antidilution law,
see supra note 84.
192. See id.
193. Hormel, 73 F.3d at 506 (citing 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24.13[1] [a], at 24-106 (3d ed. 1995)). The Hormel court specified
that dilution is a "gradual whittling away of a firm's distinctive trade-mark or
name." Id. (quoting Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.
369 N.E.2d 1162 (1977)).
194. 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983).
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likelihood of dilution. 195 The court ruled on the first prong of the
test without discussion, accepting that SPAM is an "extremely
strong mark."196 The court, however, analyzed the second element,
the likelihood of dilution, in greater detail. The court separated its
dilution analysis into two categories, dilution by blurring and dilu-
tion by tarnishment.197
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals started by recognizing
that dilution occurs through blurring when the defendant uses the
plaintiff's trademark to identify the defendant's goods.198 Hormel
contended that Henson's use of Spa'am would weaken SPAM's sell-
ing power.' 99 The court rejected this argument and concluded that
Henson's use of a parody would tend to increase consumer associa-
tion of Hormel's mark to Hormel. 200 In addition, the court held
that the dissimilarity between the marks, the placement of Spa'am
next to the character likeness and the words "Muppet Treasure Is-
land" would associate Spa'am with Henson, not Hormel.20 The
court concluded that the obvious "parodic intent" and "contextual
dissimilarity" between the two marks precluded a finding that
Spa'am would blur Hormel's mark.20 2
Next, the court examined whether dilution occurred by
tarnishment. 20 3 Tarnishment of a trademark occurs when the
trademark is associated with poor quality products or portrayed in
an unwholesome or unsavory context through the junior user's use
of the trademark. 20 4 Hormel argued that tarnishment occurred be-
cause the image of Spa'am as a "grotesque," "untidy" wild boar
would cause negative and unsavory associations with Hormel's
SPAM luncheon meat.205 Rejecting Hormel's argument, the court
affirmed the district court's finding that Spa'am was a likeable, posi-
tive character unlikely to tarnish SPAMn.206 The Second Circuit
195. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 506 (citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699
F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983)).
196. Id. The court disposed of the first element, ownership of a distinctive
mark, by finding that it was beyond dispute that SPAM is an extremely strong
mark. See id.
197. See id. at 506-08.
198. See id. at 506.
199. See id. at 502.
200. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 506.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 507.
204. See id. For a discussion of dilution by tarnishment, see supra notes 787-
801 and accompanying text.
205. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 507.
206. See Hormel , 1995 WL 567369, at *1.
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Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision because Hor-
mel presented no evidence of any negative associations between
Henson's and Hormel's products. 20 7 Moreover, Henson's intent
was not to ridicule SPAM in order to sell more products.208 Actu-
ally, the parody was part of the product, for " [w] ithout Spa'am, the
joke is lost."20 9 The court concluded that there was little likelihood
of dilution by tarnishment. 210 Recognizing the nature of the
Spa'am character as that of a parody, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found neither infringement nor dilution of the luncheon
meat trademark.2 11
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
In light of the highly competitive nature of the entertainment
industry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Hormel is
a fair decision. While exhausting all avenues of legal precedent, the
court successfully balanced the interests of both parties. In so do-
ing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted trademark in-
fringement and dilution claims in a manner that is consistent with
the purpose of both claims - the protection of consumers and the
protection of the mark itself.2 12
A. Infringement
The Hormel court performed a careful analysis of the trade-
mark infringement claim by utilizing the eight factors set forth in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.213 These factors estimate
the likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods
in question. Such consumer confusion is the linchpin of a federal
trademark action.21 4 Since Polaroid, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has consistently and correctly relied upon the Polaroid fac-
tors when examining a Lanham Act claim.21 5
207. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 507.
208. See id. at 508.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 497.
212. For a discussion of these claims see supra notes 13-126 and accompany-
ing text.
213. Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). For a
discussion of the eight Polaroid factors, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying
text.
214. See Perez, supra note 21, at 1454.
215. Cases in the Second Circuit relying on the Polaroid factors include:
Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1993); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984); Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699
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While reliance on the eight Polaroid factors is consistent with
precedent, the eight factors are not dispositive of the consumer
confusion issue. In fact, precedent dictates that the Polaroid list is
not exhaustive. 21 6 Since the Polaroid test is not absolute, the Hormel
court correctly decided this case within the ambit of a type of judi-
cially created exception to a Lanham Act infringement claim. This
"exception" applies to cases which involve parodies similar to the
parody in Hormel.
Parody is a class of humor which incorporates recognizable ele-
ments of the object of ridicule into the parody. Parodies are
uniquely different from other imitations or uses of similar marks
and therefore need to be looked at in a different light. The Hormel
court recognized the distinctiveness of this form of humor and
properly afforded it the corresponding protection. Such a recogni-
tion by the Hormel court follows the trend towards broader protec-
tion for parodic works for the sake of entertainment. 21 7 The Hormel
court not only protected consumers from confusion, but also pro-
tected consumers' right to entertainment by affording the Henson
character its status as a parody. What the Hormel decision makes
clear is that while the eight Polaroid factors are needed to protect
consumers from confusion, the factors are indeed flexible, espe-
cially when applied in the case of a parody.
Categorizing a parody as an apparent exception in cases like
Hormel may seem at first glance unwarranted. After all, the ultimate
test for the success of an infringement claim is likelihood of con-
sumer confusion and a parody may lead to consumer confusion.
The Polaroid factors however, are not exhaustive. The Hormel court,
therefore, was justified in examining the case on another level, as a
parody. By examining a case in this slightly different context, a
court can still preserve the original purpose of section 1114(1), to
prevent consumer confusion. 2 18 The Hormel court accomplished
this by examining whether the parody was likely to confuse. This
latitude was justified, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals right-
fully held, because although the two marks were at first glance simi-
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
216. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d
Cir. 1984).
217. See Keller & Berstein, supra note 105, at 153.
218. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). The Cliffs Notes court stated specifically that "the
[Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free ex-
pression." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
379
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lar, it was very likely that the parodic context in which the name
Spa'am appeared would distinguish the marks in a consumer's
mind.219
Viewing the Polaroid factors in light of the nature and purpose
of a parody allowed the Hormel court to protect the integrity of the
Lanham Act without compromising the freedom of the creative
process. The Hormel decision was mindful of the tension between
protecting the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion and
protecting the public interest in free expression. When examining
each Polaroid factor in turn, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
consistently reflected on the nature of Henson's alleged infringe-
ment as a parody. 220 When deciding on the ultimate question of
consumer confusion, the court properly concluded that:
Henson's use of the name "Spa'am" is simply another in a
long line of Muppet lampoons. Moreover, this Muppet
brand of humor is widely recognized and enjoyed. Thus,
consumers of Henson's merchandise, all of which will dis-
play the words "Muppet Treasure Island," are likely to see
the name "Spa'am" as the joke it was intended to be.22 1
The court correctly found Spa'am not likely to confuse because it
was indeed a parody.
The parody exception to section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act is
not absolutely guaranteed simply because a parody is involved.222
The check on the parody exception is the fact that the confusion
standard remains. A court must still look to see if consumer confu-
sion is likely. The standard, however, is a likelihood of confusion
based on the parody.
The objective of section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act is to pro-
tect the reasonable consumer. 223 Such a standard does not presup-
pose a certain class of consumers. Rather, it encompasses "an
219. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 504.
220. See id. at 503.
221. Id.
222. Numerous cases involving parodies have been found to violate § 1114(1)
of the Lanham Act. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769,
777 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's ad parody was likely to cause con-
sumer confusion and infringe on plaintiffs trademark); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (holding that parody stickers based on plaintiffs dolls would lead to confu-
sion as to source of stickers); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that defendant's posters demonstrated high
probability of confusion).
223. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.01-23.02[1].
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appreciable number of reasonable buyers [who] are likely to be
confused." 224 The Hormel decision was again on point when the
court looked to the degree of consumer sophistication. The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that consumers who want
to purchase SPAM merchandise do so to affiliate themselves with
Hormel's product.225 Consumers would not be confused by Hen-
son's merchandise because the elements of parody in Henson's
Spa'am merchandise distinguish those products from ones manu-
factured by Hormel. 226 This conclusion by the court once again
demonstrates the court's proper application of the Polaroid factors
in light of the parody.
B. Dilution
While dilution is still a somewhat nebulous concept, one thing
appears clear: dilution has been limited exclusively to protection of
the selling power of a mark via the mark's identifying function.2 27
This notion affirms Frank I. Schechter's founding view of dilution,
that the mark actually sells the product and therefore the mark is
worthy of protection.228 The Hormel court focused on the dilution
concept envisioned by the concept's founder. While there is uncer-
tainty concerning the definition of dilution, 229 the Hormel court cor-
rectly adopted the earliest definition of dilution as a "gradual
whittling away of a firm's distinctive trade-mark or name."230 The
Second Circuit considered the dilution doctrine and logically ana-
lyzed dilution in terms of blurring and tarnishment.
1. Blurring
Dilution by way of blurring occurs when the plaintiffs mark is
used on a plethora of goods thus decreasing the mark's ability to
serve as a unique identifier. 23 1 In the arena of entertainment, espe-
cially motion pictures, the blurring prong of dilution is significant.
In recent times, the use of a full-blown merchandising campaign to
224. Id. § 23.01[2].
225. See Horme4 73 F.3d at 504.
226. See id. at 505.
227. See Pattishall, supra note 69, at 619-20.
228. See Shire, supra note 4, at 275-77 (discussing origin and development of
dilution theory).
229. See id. at 292-94 (discussing meaning of dilution).
230. Hormel, 73 F.3d at 506 (quoting Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied
Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (1977)).
231. See id. For a discussion of blurring, see supra notes 723-767 and accom-
panying text.
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promote a motion picture has become common. In fact, the use of
this method of merchandising is exactly what Hormel feared would
infringe and dilute its SPAM mark.232 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision to protect Henson's parodic character in Hen-
son's motion picture not only preserved the free flow of creative
ideas, but also the full realization of the economic capacity of a
movie.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals properly ruled against
Hormel on a theory of blurring. The court's decision on this issue
specifically pointed to the notion that dilution by blurring was un-
likely, since Henson was not using the name Spa'am as a product
brand name, but as a character under the Henson trademark. 2 33
Again, the Hormel court pointed to the unique nature of the parody
to support its finding of no dilution. This holding is correct be-
cause parodies are distinctive. The Hormel court relied upon prece-
dent which indicates that parodies "tend[ ] to increase public
identification" of the parodied mark.234 This increased public iden-
tification occurred in the Hormel case. The parody using the
Spa'am character is obvious, not subtle. When a parody is so obvi-
ous, blurring is unlikely.23 5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
therefore, was correct because the parody in this case was obvious,
especially since the Muppets are known for their parodies. Addi-
tionally, the similarities between the two marks are superficial at
best.
The Hormel court's holding of no dilution is correct for two
more reasons. First, the word Spa'am was spoken only once in the
entire movie.23 6 The overwhelming infrequency of the use of the
name Spa'am in the movie greatly reduced the opportunity that the
name SPAM would be diluted. In addition, Henson planned to
place the words "Muppet Treasure Island" on any merchandise fea-
turing the name or likeness of Spa'am. 2 37 These safeguards dis-
pelled the notion that blurring would occur by use of the Spa'am
name or likeness on merchandise. The Hormel court made the cor-
rect finding with respect to dilution. The merchandising aspect of
232. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 502. Hormel feared that sales of merchandise fea-
turing Spa'am would directly cut into the sales of secondary SPAM items. See id.
233. See id. at 506.
234. Id. (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482,
1490 (10th Cir. 1987)).
235. See id. at 506. But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28
F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that parody was so subtle that likelihood of
confusion and dilution existed).
236. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 500.
237. See id. at 501.
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this motion picture was preserved and Hormel's inherent value in
its mark was not compromised but arguably increased thanks to
Henson's promise to specifically associate Spa'am with "Muppet
Treasure Island" on its merchandise.
2. Tarnishment
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when the trademark is linked
to products of inferior quality, or is portrayed in a seedy or unsa-
vory way.23 8 The decision in Hormel properly denied relief on this
theory as well. The Henson Production Company and the Muppets
are well known and well respected in the entertainment industry.
They are responsible for providing quality entertainment for chil-
dren, and adults alike. One of the characteristics of their entertain-
ment repertoire are their parodies. The character Spa'am follows
in this Henson tradition. Any association of Hormel's product to
Henson's Spa'am character would be associating one quality prod-
uct with another. The prestige or reputation of SPAM will not de-
crease or suffer tarnishment by any possible association between the
two marks.
The Hormel decision follows precedent which established a dis-
tinction when dealing with dilution by tarnishment. Courts have
drawn the line in dilution by tamishment cases along the lines of
good taste.239 The Hormel court is no exception. Cases that have
found dilution by tarnishment include Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publications,240 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,241 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cin-
ema, Ltd.24 2 and Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.2 43 All of these
cases share the common characteristic of parodies gone wrong.
Each involved a parody which the court determined crossed the
line of humor over to tastelessness, devoid of any wholesome en-
tertainment value.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not find any tarnish-
ment by use of the Spa'am character. Their decision was based on
the finding that Spa'am was not unsavory, but actually a likeable,
238. See id. at 507. For a discussion of tarnishment, see supra notes 787-801
and accompanying text.
239. See Welkowitz, supra note 18, at 556 (discussing how parodies which bor-
der on line of good taste are likely to tarnish senior user).
240. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
241. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
242. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
243. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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positive character. 244 This finding is consistent with the line of par-
ody cases. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was aware that the
right to a trademark does not include the right not to become the
object of humor. With this in mind, the court correctly restrained
itself from increasing the scope of New York's antidilution law to
prohibit all uses of a trademark that the owner prefers not to be
made. When a parody remains in the realm of humor, entertain-
ment and good taste, it will likely be protected. The Hormel court
recognized this distinction and reached the proper conclusion.
Finally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision reflects a
degree of judicial restraint in applying antidilution statutes. The
judicial hesitancy towards dilution is based on a concern that a
broad application of the dilution doctrine will inhibit free commer-
cial use of language and foster a monopolization of language. 245
The Hormel court seemed to have this same concern. Perhaps the
decision in Hormel is based upon the recognition that the dilution
doctrine, if applied too broadly, can "swallow up all competition in
the claim of protection against trade name infringement."246
Through an exercise of judicial restraint, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals protected the open marketplace of expression.
VI. IMPACT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided, in Hormel Foods
Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions,247 that neither infringement nor di-
lution occurred by use of Henson's Spa'am character in Henson's
movie. Early cases dealing with these same issues reflect a judicial
ambiguity and reluctance to confront infringement and especially
dilution concepts. The Hormel court, however, confronted both is-
sues with certainty. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis
in this case continues the progressive approach courts have taken
concerning the treatment of parody cases. This decision reflects a
tolerant view of parodies and their place in the entertainment
industry.2 48
244. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 507.
245. See Handler, supra note 89, at 278 (discussing how broad view of dilution
could result in undesirable monopolization of language).
246. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981).
247. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
248. The Hormel decision also reflects the intent of the recently signed Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act which creates a new federal cause of action for own-
ers of "famous" trademarks. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, § 43(c),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
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The decision in Hormel protected both free competition and
creativity. In dealing with a vague antidilution statute, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals used available precedent to guide its deci-
sion. What is apparent from this case is the need for more gui-
dance from antidilution statutes. Because this case involved a
parody, the court had the luxury of considering the exceptions to
the statute which have been carved out by precedent. In cases
which do not involve parodies, direction from the language of an-
tidilution statutes would prove helpful. The Hormel decision is one
in a long line of cases where the protection available from an an-
tidilution statute is implicated. The extensive analysis the court em-
ployed to reach its holding would be unnecessary with clear
statutory language defining dilution. Through amendments to state
antidilution statutes, some guidance as to the precise definition of
dilution is greatly needed.
The ramifications of the Hormel decision will greatly affect the
motion picture industry. Not only does the decision fortify the use
of a parody as a comedic device, the decision also strengthens the
merchandising market surrounding motion pictures. This increas-
ingly popular component of a movie release gained appreciation by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Hormel decision.
The case of Hormel although seemingly humourous, is not friv-
olous. 2 49 It represents the notion that there exists a form of humor
that borrows from an original work and expands upon this original
in such a way as to turn the original into its own entity. This form
of humor is gaining increasing acceptance in our judiciary. Rather
than trying to fight this "form of flattery," movie studios with trade-
marks possibly subject to infringement or dilution should concen-
trate their energies not on finding subjective evil in the parody but
instead on laughing at such a parody objectively with the rest of
society.
Laura L. Gribbin
249. See Thank You, Spa'am, Hormel Meats its Muppet Match, Cincinnati En-
quirer, Jan. 8, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 2225857.
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